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ABSTRACT 
 
This study examined whether there were differences in the credit ratings of family firms, one type of business ownership 
and corporate governance in Korea. Credit rating agencies which evaluate a company's ability to pay back the debt 
play a key role in evaluating corporate values in the capital market. A variety of standards are applied to evaluate 
corporate credit ratings. The corporate governance structure is also under consideration. Credit rating agencies may 
give excellent credit ratings to family firms if they judge that family companies have efficient governance structures 
resulting in lower agency costs as companies which try to match minority shareholders' interests. On the other hand, 
they may give lower credit ratings to family firms if they judge that family firms have a negative impact on firm 
performance. In this context, this study planned to investigate how credit rating agencies constituting the mainstay in 
the evaluation of corporate values with analysts judged the roles of family firms which had been controversial in 
previous studies in the capital market, and present direct results. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
his study analyzed whether there were differences in the credit ratings of family firms, one type of 
business ownership and corporate governance in Korea. The previous studies on family firms had 
analyzed the effects of family firms on the quality of earnings, management performance, and others 
all the while. They did not show consistent results. When family firms are examined in terms of traditional agency 
costs, it is still a controversial issue that the majority shareholder infringes on minority shareholders' wealth, or match 
with minority shareholders' interests to achieve the goal, the maximization of minority shareholders' wealth. 
 
Credit rating agencies which evaluate a company's ability to pay back the debt play a key role in evaluating corporate 
values in the capital market. A variety of standards are applied to evaluate corporate credit ratings. The corporate 
governance structure is also under consideration. Credit rating agencies may give excellent credit ratings to family-
run firms if they judge that family firms have efficient governance structures resulting in lower agency costs as firms 
which try to match minority shareholders' interests. 
 
In this study, family firms in Korea are defined based on the two standards as follows: whether the family member of 
the real owner of the company, namely the majority shareholder, participates in the corporate management; whether 
the majority shareholder's family member holds 5 % or more ownership (shareholding) in the relevant company. In 
other words, the company was classified as a family company when the majority shareholder's family member 
participated in the corporate management and holds shareholdings representing at least 5% of shares and voting rights 
in the company. It can be seen that the interest alignment hypothesis is supported when credit rating agencies give 
better credit ratings to the company that the majority shareholder's family member has directly participated in the 
management as a member of the Board of Directors. They may also have judged that a family company had the 
positive management environment and business competitiveness when they gave a better credit rating to a family 
company in evaluating corporate management environment and business competitiveness. In this context, this study 
is meaningful in that it investigated how credit rating agencies constituting the mainstay in the evaluation of corporate 
values with analysts judged the roles of family companies which had been controversial in previous studies in the 
capital market, and present direct results. 
T 
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This study consists of the following. summarizes previous studies and sets forth the hypothesis of this study. explains 
the process of selecting samples used for testing of the hypothesis and study model. explains the results of empirical 
analysis, and summarizes the conclusions and contributions of this study. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Chapter II presents the findings from the relevant literature and 
develops the testable hypothesis based on relevant literature. Chapter III describes the sample selection and research 
design. Chapter IV reports the empirical results. Chapter V offers conclusions and implications. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
 
Literature Review 
 
There had been no universally agreed definition of the family firm so far. The family firm had been defined in various 
ways in previous studies. Faccio et al. (2001) studied majority shareholders' arbitrary management. They classify the 
firm that the founder's family owns 20% or more of shares as a family-controlled firm, and present that there are many 
companies whose real owners are the founders' families in East Asian countries such as Korea. Handler (1989) takes 
precaution against the studies using only one of those standards, maintaining that 'there are fundamental differences 
between the studies that family companies are defined based on the ruling family's participation into the corporate 
management and those that family companies are classified based on the ruling family's ownership. Reflecting this 
opinion, many recent studies on family companies had used the two standards, management participation and 
ownership, at the same time to define the family firm. Westhead and Cowling (1998) in Great Britain define the family 
firm, manifoldly considering whether family members participate in the corporate management as CEOs or members 
of the Board of Directors. Anderson and Reeb (2003) classify companies as family and non-family companies based 
on the percentage of shares owned by the founder's family, and the founder's family members as the members of the 
Board of Directors. 
 
To sum up the results of the previous studies, the family firm may be defined in three ways: the participation of the 
real owner of the firm, namely the ruling family, into the corporate management; the ruling family's ownership 
(shareholding) at more than a certain level in the relevant firm; and the complex use of the two standards. This study 
intended to investigate whether credit ratings had differently been given to companies owned and controlled families. 
This study defined the family firm, using both of the two standards, the ruling family's direct participation into the 
corporate management and the percentage of its shares. 
 
It is mandatory to attach the credit rating evaluated by credit rating agencies when a company issues its corporate 
bonds to raise long-term (one year or more) funds directly in the financial market. Therefore, companies which issue 
their corporate bonds may make efforts in various ways to get better credit ratings. 
 
There are three credit rating agencies such as Korea Ratings, Nice Investors Service Ratings, and Korea Investors 
Service Ratings in Korea. They publicly announce their credit rating methodologies for each business sector on their 
websites every year. As a result of examining the evaluation methodologies of credit rating agencies, the main contents 
of their evaluations are summarized as table 1. 
 
Among many items, management policies, corporate governance structure, policy effectiveness, staff levels, and 
others are considered to analyze the management environment of the company. The company with a good corporate 
governance structure makes an effort to reduce the level of information asymmetry between managers and investors. 
As it creates the transparent financial environment, the good governance structure reduces the information asymmetry 
between managers and investors, and contributes to an increase in corporate performance and values. Credit rating 
agencies may give a higher credit rating to the family company where the owner's family member participated in the 
management as a member of the Board of Directors when they judge that the relevant company has a good corporate 
governance structure. 
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Table 1. Main factor of credit rating evaluation 
Category Detailed item 
Industrial Environment General characteristics of the industry, the internal structure of the industry, and competitive factors 
Management Environment 
Management policies, corporate governance structure, policy effectiveness, and staff 
levels 
The current state of affiliated companies and interdependence among affiliated 
companies 
Business Competitiveness Position, competitiveness, and share in the market 
Profitability and Financial Structure Growth, profitability, financial policy and structure 
 
Hypothesis Development 
 
A credit rating represents the system that the financial and non-financial data, and the relationship with affiliated 
companies of the company which issued bonds, the business sector of the company, the characteristics of the industry, 
the business environment, and others are analyzed to evaluate a company's ability to pay back the principal 
comprehensively, and officially announce its rating.  The independent and objective credit rating given after the credit 
worthiness of a debtor (a company) is evaluated adjusts the problem of information asymmetry in the capital market 
to improve the efficiency of the capital market (Standard and Poor's 2001). Credit rating agencies consider the 
governance structure to assign credit ratings because there is a high possibility that the financial condition of the 
company is damaged and creditors face losses when the company has the poor governance structure (FitchRatings 
2004). 
 
Standard & Poor’s Corporate Governance Scores (2002) also reports that transparency involves the timely disclosure 
of adequate information concerning a firm’s operating and financial performance and its corporate governance 
practices. For a well-governed firm, standards of timely disclosure and transparency are high. This enables 
shareholders, creditors and directors to effectively monitor the actions of management and the operating and financial 
performance of the firm. 
 
The previous studies also show that the excellent credit rating is given because the corporate governance structure 
reduces the level of information asymmetry. Ashbaugh et al. (2006) studied the relationships between the 
characteristics of various corporate governance structures and credit ratings systematically. As a result of their 
investigation, it is shown that the larger the number of outside directors is, the more the chairperson of the Board of 
Director is separated from the CEO, and the more financial professionals are within the Board of Directors, the better 
credit ratings were given because the level of information asymmetry is reduced. Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) state 
that the stronger the governance structure, the higher credit rating is given and the lower capital cost is shared, 
mentioning the effects of the governance structure on agency problems and the level of information asymmetry. 
 
Verrecchia(1983) reports that companies tended to reduce the level of information asymmetry to lower the cost 
required to raise external funds. Bushman and Smith (2001) mention that the public announcement to reduce the level 
of information asymmetry may play a role in improving a company's ability to invest in profitable investment 
alternatives. Sengupta (1998) maintains that the corporate governance structure reduces the level of information 
asymmetry to influence bond ratings and the rate of return.  The Board of Directors plays a role in lowering the agency 
cost of the management and stakeholders and is recognized as one of the important factors which influence the 
reliability of the financial reporting process in the light of creditors because it functions to monitor and check the 
management (Dichev and Skinner 2002). Klein (2002) states that the characteristics of the Board of Directors which 
monitors the financial reporting process influence the validity of accounting information. Smith and Warner (1979) 
maintain that the bond price depends on the characteristics of the Board of Directors when the capital cost related to 
the effectiveness of the creditor's debt contract is measured because the Board of Directors functions to supervise the 
financial reporting process. It is seen that creditors are highly interested in the corporate governance structure which 
influences the reliability of financial reporting because they depend on the debt contract based on accounting figures. 
Finally, it can be assumed that there is a possibility that credit rating agencies may give better credit ratings to 
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companies which have the effective corporate governance structure, reflecting the creditors' expectation like this. 
Therefore, there is a possibility that better credit ratings may be given to the family companies which are judged to 
have the excellent governance structure. However, there has been no study on the effects of Korean family companies 
on credit ratings so far. The results of the previous studies on the effects of family companies on the capital market 
are also mixed. 
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) report that the constant problem about the agency related to managers' pursuit of private 
interests, and the level of information asymmetry may infringe the interests of shareholders or creditors.  Lafond and 
Roychowdhury (2008) present an empirical result that conservatism is strengthened because the agency problem is 
intensified and the demand for conservatism consequentially increases as the separation of ownership measured by 
the percentage of shares owned by the manager the and control becomes severe. They also show a result that the 
conservatism of accounting information increases when the CEO is not the founder. Wang (2006) presents an 
empirical result that the quality of accounting earnings is high in case of the company owned by the founder's family. 
To sum up the results of previous studies, it is not easy to judge that the role of the majority shareholder as the corporate 
governance structure has a good or bad effect on credit ratings. Therefore, it is a question whether credit rating agencies 
evaluate family companies to have better governance structures than those of non-family companies, and give better 
credit ratings to them in evaluating the governance and ownership structure. In this context, the hypothesis of this 
study was set up in the form of a null hypothesis as follows: 
 
Hypothesis: There is no relationship between family firm and credit rating. 
 
SELECTION OF SAMPLES AND STUDY METHODOLOGY SELECTION OF SAMPLES 
 
This study selected enterprises listed in the Korean Stock Exchange (KSE) stock market between 2000 and 2010 that 
satisfy following conditions: 
 
(1) Firms not in financial industries 
(2) Firms with December 31 fiscal year-end 
 
We exclude financial firms in our sample because the format and nature of accounts on the financial statements in 
financial firms differ from those of other firms, making it challenging to perform an industry analysis. Lastly, we select 
firms with a December 31 fiscal year-end to facilitate comparison. Aslo Winsorization was performed on top 1% and 
bottom 10 of variables used in the empirical analysis to control the effects of outliers. We collect data through 
KISVALUE database provided by NICE Credit Evaluation, Inc. After eliminating companies that do not have adequate 
data, the final sample consisted of 2,555 firm-year observations. 
 
Measurement of Family Firm 
 
It is first necessary to define the family-run company to investigate the conservatism of accounting information of 
family-run companies. Even though there are many different definitions of family companies in previous studies, this 
study used the definition of family companies, which might influence the computation of accounting information more 
directly in light of the conservatism of accounting information. Faccio et al.(2001) states that the family member of 
the real major shareholder exercises his or her influence when he or she occupies the key post such as the CEO or the 
chairperson of the Board of Directors. In other words, the family that owns a company can influence the conservatism 
of accounting information more directly when it directly participates in the corporate management. This study defines 
the company where the major shareholder's family member is a director (registered executive) or the CEO as a family 
company. However, the companies where held less than 5% shares were not regarded as family-run companies 
because the companies were judged to have difficulty in exercising substantial control, referring to a previous study 
maintaining that management participation and the percentage of shares should complexly be considered (Handler 
1989; Westhead and Cowling 1998). In other words, family companies were defined as companies which met two 
standards, the participation in the corporate management and the possession of 5% shares or more, at the same time 
in this study. 
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Research Model 
 𝑖𝑡+1  = 𝛽0  + 𝛽1𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽2𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽3𝑉𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽4𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽5𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽6𝑉𝑖𝑡+𝛽 7𝑖 𝑡     + 𝛽 8𝑖 𝑡      +  𝜖 𝑖 𝑡 + (1) 
 
This study used the data of the lowest bond credit ratings among credit ratings evaluated by three credit rating agencies 
(Korea Ratings, Nice Investors Service Ratings, and Korea Investors Service Ratings) as a surrogate variable in order 
to measure conservatively. Equidistant interval scores by stage (1 point at the lowest C grade, 2 points at the next 
lowest CC grade... 19 points at the next highest AA+ grade, and the 20 points at the highest AAA grade) were given 
for an analysis. A credit rating variable during the next term (t+1 term) was used as a dependent variable to control 
the endogeneity problem, whereas an interest variable during the current term (t term) and other control variables were 
applied as independent variables. 
 
BONDit+1 = Bond credit rating(1 to 20 points) 
FAMit = 1 if firms is a family firm, 0 otherwise. 
SIZEit = The natural logarithm of the total asset 
LEVit = Debt ratio (total debt/total asset) 
ROAit = The return on total assets (net profit/ total asset) 
MBit = The market-book ratio of capital (capital market value/book value) 
INTCOVit = Interest coverage ratio (net earnings before taxes/interest cost) 
BETAit = Beta estimation, the number of months for five years before the relevant year as a variable 
corresponding to the systematic risk. It is estimated through a market model, using return data. 
KOSPI returns are used as market returns. 
ALTMANZit = Altman Z-score(=1.2*WC+1.4*RE+3.3*EBIT+0.6*MV+0.999*SALES) 
WC = working capital/total assets 
RE = earned surplus /total assets 
EBIT 
 
= SALES net earnings before taxes /total assets 
MV = SALES capital market value/total debts 
SALES = SALES sales/ total assets 
i, t = SALES firm and = year 
 
In other words, the bond credit rating, a dependent variable in this study, was measured with the use of bond ratings 
during the next term (t+1 term), because it reflected the financial condition shown in the financial statements of a 
company, the corporate governance structure, and others to be subject to an ex post facto evaluation. The family 
company variable (Family), an interest variable, was measured as 1 when the members of the ruling family are the 
CEO or directors of the company, and hold 5% shares or more. Otherwise, it was measured as a dummy variable, 0. 
 
It is necessary to control the variables which decisively influence credit ratings to verify the effects of family 
companies on credit ratings. Accordingly, the company size (SIZE) measured with natural logarithm of the total asset, 
the debt ratio (LEV), the return on total assets(ROA), the market-book ratio (MB), the interest coverage 
ratio(INTCOV), the largest shareholder's share percentage (LARGE), Beta estimation(BETA), listing on the 
KOSDAQ (MARKET), and the Altman Z-score (ALTMANZ) were included in the model. The size of a company was 
controlled as the size of the corporate asset measured with natural logarithm of the total asset. The debt ratio (LEV) 
is expected to have a negative (-) effect on the credit rating of the company because the higher the debt ratio is, the 
higher the possibility of the corporate default becomes. The return on total assets (ROA) is assumed to exercise a 
positive (＋) effect on the credit rating of the company because the higher the return on total assets, the lower the 
corporate default risk becomes (Francis et al. 2005). The high market-book ratio of capital (MB) means a high growth 
opportunity, a high accounting conservatism, and a low risk. Accordingly, the market-book ratio (MB) is expected to 
have a positive (＋) effect on the credit rating of the company because the higher the ratio is, the lower the risk premium 
becomes (Gode and Mohanram 2003). The interest coverage ratio (INTCOV) is also expected to have a positive (＋) 
effect on the credit rating of the company because the higher the interest coverage ratio, the higher the company's 
ability to pay interests becomes (Sengupta 1998). The Beta estimation(BETA) corresponding to the market risk is 
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assumed to have a negative (-) effect on the credit rating of the company as a variable estimated through a market 
model with the use of the monthly return data for the five years before the relevant year (Bhojraj and Sengupta 2003). 
The Altman (1968)의 Z-score used to determine corporate insolvency was included to control the effects of the 
stability of the profit structure and other financial variables on credit ratings. It is expected to have a positive (＋) 
effect on credit ratings. Lastly, year dummy variables were included in control variables to control the effect of the 
particular year on credit ratings. 
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Analysis 
 
The descriptive statistics of 2,555 samples used in this study are presented in Table 2. As the average of bond credit 
ratings used as a dependent variable is 12.39, the average credit ratings of samples are between BBB and BBB+. As 
the average (median) of family company variables (FAMILY), a dummy variable determining family companies is 
0.700 (1.000), 70% of family companies are shown to participate in the corporate management in Korea. 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics (n=2,555) 
Variable Mean Standard deviation Minimum Median Maximum 
BOND 12.39 3.87 1.00 12.00 20.00 
FAMILY 0.70 0.46 0.00 1.00 1.00 
SIZE 20.26 1.60 17.32 20.00 24.41 
LEV 0.52 0.19 0.14 0.53 0.99 
ROA 0.02 0.07 -0.33 0.03 0.19 
MB 0.99 0.98 0.00 0.68 5.75 
INTCOV 15.60 56.51 -24.96 2.34 455.74 
BETA 0.94 0.46 0.00 0.93 2.13 
ALTMANZ 672.14 826.80 1.16 369.80 4525.20 
 
The variable definitions: 
 
BOND = is Bond credit rating (1 to 20 points). FAMILY is 1 if firms is a family firm, 0 otherwise. SIZE is the 
natural logarithm of total asset. 
LEV = is (total debt/total asset) 
ROA = is the return on total assets (net profit /total asset) 
MB = is the market-book ratio of capital (capital market value/book value) INTCOV is the interest coverage 
ratio (net earnings before taxes/interest cost) 
BETA = is the Beta estimation, the number of months for five years before the relevant year as a variable 
corresponding to the systematic risk. It is estimated through a market model, using return data. KOSPI 
returns are used as market returns. 
 
ALTMANZ is Altman Z-score(=1.2*WC+1.4*RE+3.3*EBIT+0.6*MV+0.999*SALES) 
 
WC = working capital/total assets  
RE = earned surplus /total assets 
EBIT = net earnings before taxes /total assets  
MV = capital market value/total debts  
SALES = sales/ total assets 
 
Table 3 shows the correlation among variables used in this study. First, variable FAMILY showed a significant positive 
(+) correlation at 1% significance level with variable BOND. This correlation implies family firm has a positive effect 
on credit rating. 
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Table 3. Pearson’s correlation 
 FAMILY SIZE LEV ROA MB INTCOV BETA ALTMANZ 
BOND 0.079 0.651 -0.248 0.410 0.075 0.196 -0.084 0.231 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0002) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
FAMILY  -0.182 -0.112 -0.008 -0.189 0.004 0.051 -0.077  (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.6697) (<.0001) (0.8382) (0.0094) (<.0001) 
SIZE   0.179 0.182 0.123 0.047 0.178 0.008   (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0168) (<.0001) (0.7046) 
LEV    -0.357 0.142 -0.299 0.227 -0.564    (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
ROA     0.029 0.251 -0.098 0.268     (0.1456) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
MB      0.082 0.096 0.514      (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
INTCOV       -0.078 0.406       (<.0001) (<.0001) 
BETA        -0.085        (<.0001) 
Variable definitions: refer to Table 2. Values in parentheses are p-values. 
 
Multivariate Regression Analysis 
 
The results of a regression analysis to verify a hypothesis are presented in <Table 4>. When credit rating agencies 
recognize the excellent or poor governance structure of family companies to reflect it in the evaluation of a company's 
ability to pay back the debt, family companies may get higher or lower credit ratings than non-family companies. 
 
As a result, the regression coefficient of FAMILY in a linear regression model is 0.291 (t=2.65). It is shown that 
FAMILY has a significantly positive (+) effect on the bond credit rating, a dependent variable, at the level of 1%. This 
result means that higher credit ratings are given to family companies than non-family companies. It shows that credit 
rating agencies evaluate family companies to have better governance structures than those of non-family companies. 
 
Table 4: Effect of Family Firm on Credit Rating 
 𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽2𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑖𝑡+ 𝛽8𝑖𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 
Variables Expected Sign Dependent Variable: BOND Coefficient t Value 
Intercept ? -17.45 -24.99*** 
FAMILY ? 0.291 2.65*** 
SIZE ＋ 1.674 50.74*** 
LEV － -6.481 -15.45*** 
ROA ＋ 8.759 11.94*** 
MB ＋ 0.322 4.3*** 
INTCOV ＋ 0.002 2.43** 
BETA － -1.145 -10.15*** 
ALTMANZ ＋ -0.0002 -2.2** 
Industry dummy N/A Included 
Year dummy N/A Included 
F-Value 208.69*** 
Adjusted R2 0.607 
N 2,555 
Notes: ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. Variable definitions: refer to Table 2. 
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Effect of Family Firm on Credit Rating Measured as Commercial Paper (Additional Test 1) 
 
The same analysis was made for commercial paper ratings as the first additional verification for a robustness test. 
Credit ratings were divided into bond and commercial paper ratings. The long- and the short-term ratings were 
respectively applied to bonds and commercial papers.  In case of commercial papers, 12 points were given to the 
highest A1 grade, while 1 point was given to the lowest D grade. The results of the additional analysis that a hypothesis 
was re-verified with commercial paper ratings as a dependent variable are shown in <Table 5>. The regression 
coefficient of FAMILY identifies the robustness of the result of hypothesis testing, showing 0.202(t=1.74), a 
significantly positive (+) value at the level of 1%. 
 
Table 5. Effect of Family Firm on Credit Rating Measured as Commercial Paper (Additional Test 1) 
 𝑖𝑡+1  = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑖𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 
Variables Expected Sign Dependent Variable: CP Coefficient t Value 
Intercept ? -17.699 -21.75*** 
FAMILY ? 0.202 1.74* 
SIZE ＋ 1.376 36.91*** 
LEV － -3.992 -8.49*** 
ROA ＋ 3.841 4.14*** 
MB ＋ 0.182 2.2** 
INTCOV ＋ 0.002 2.18** 
BETA － -1.01 -8.57*** 
ALTMANZ ＋ 0 2.83*** 
Industry dummy N/A Included 
Year dummy N/A Included 
F-Value  120.86*** 
Adjusted R2  0.609 
N  1,304 
Notes: ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
CP: Commercial Paper(1~12points) 
Other variable definitions: refer to Table 2. 
 
Effect of Family Firm and Chaebol on Credit Rating (Additional Test 2) 
 
There is a group of large-scale companies, called conglomerates, in Korea. They have exercised a great influence on 
the Korean economy. Even though they have a positive effect on the Korean economy, they also exercise a harmful 
effect with the formation of monopolies. This study intended to test how family companies which are conglomerates 
had influenced credit ratings as the second additional verification. When family companies which are conglomerates 
have a positive effect on credit ratings, the coefficient value of the interaction variable between FAMILY and 
CHAEBOL in <Table 6> will be positive (+). On the other hand, when family companies which are conglomerates 
are negatively evaluated by credit rating agencies, the above value will be negative (-). As a result of an empirical 
analysis, the relevant value is shown to be –0.625 (t=-2.86), a significantly negative value at the level of 1%. Namely, 
this study shows that credit rating agencies recognize family companies which are conglomerates to have negative 
corporate governance structures. 
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Table 6. Effect of Family Firm and Chaebol on Credit Rating (Additional Test 2) 
 𝑖𝑡+1  = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑖𝑡 ⅹ𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽7𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽8𝑉𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽9𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝑖𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 
Variables Expected Sign Dependent Variable: CP Coefficient t Value 
Intercept ? -14.698 -16.18*** 
FAMILY ? 0.537 3.95* 
CAHEBOL  1.149 5.62*** 
FAMILYxCHAEBOL  -0.625 -2.86*** 
SIZE ＋ 1.528 34.88*** 
LEV － -6.455 -15.46*** 
ROA ＋ 9.024 12.36*** 
MB ＋ 0.279 3.73*** 
INTCOV ＋ 0.002 2.39** 
BETA － -1.228 -10.84*** 
ALTMANZ ＋ 0 -2.01** 
Industry dummy N/A Included 
Year dummy N/A Included 
F-Value  192.79*** 
Adjusted R2  0.609 
N  2,555 
Notes: ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. CHAEBOL: 1 if firms belongs to a conglomerate, O 
otherwise.  Other variable definitions: refer to Table 2. 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
This study analyzed the effects of Korean family companies on credit ratings. Family companies had been measured 
in various ways in previous studies. In this study, the company was classified as a family company because it was 
judged the company owner's family member exercised a significant impact on the corporate management when he or 
she participated in the corporate management and held shareholdings representing at least 5% of shares and voting 
rights in the company. The result of analyzing 2,555 companies which had got credit ratings from credit rating agencies 
between 2000 and 2010 is summarized as follows: Above all, it is shown that credit rating agencies had given higher 
credit ratings to family companies than non-family companies. It is assumed that Korean credit rating agencies judged 
that family companies had good governance structures to have a positive effect on corporate values. These results are 
shown to be consistent with those of the additional verification on the measurement of credit ratings with commercial 
paper ratings. However, the result is that credit rating agencies perceived family companies which are conglomerates 
negatively. It is shown that Korean conglomerates were evaluated to have poor governance structures when the owners 
actually participated in the corporate management. 
 
This study is very meaningful as the first study which investigated the effects of Korean family companies on credit 
ratings. In addition, it is shown that credit rating agencies recognized family-run companies to play a positive role in 
the governance structure, and gave high credit ratings to them. Accordingly, this study makes a contribution in that it 
investigated the response of the capital market to Korean family companies. 
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